Quality and Advertising in a Vertically Differentiated Market by Zsolt, Katona & Eli, Ofek
Quality and Advertising in a Vertically
Differentiated Market
Zsolt Katona and Elie Ofek∗ †
May 24, 2007
∗Preliminary version, comments welcome.
†Zsolt Katona is a Ph.D. candidate at INSEAD, Bd. de Constance, 77305, Fontainebleau,
France. E-mail: zsolt.katona@insead.edu. Tel.: +33 1 60 72 92 26 Fax: +33 1 60 74 55 00,
Elie Ofek is Associate Professor at Harvard Business School, eofek@hbs.edu, Tel.: +1 617
495 6301. We thank Miklos Sarvary, David Soberman and Timothy Van-Zandt for valuable
suggestions.
Quality and Advertising in a Vertically
Differentiated Market
Abstract
In this paper, we examine firms’ quality positions when consumers can only con-
sider purchasing products that they are aware of through advertising. Consumers
compare the products they are aware of, and choose the product that maximizes their
utility net of price. Firms choose product quality in a first stage, their advertising
strategy in a second stage, and set prices in the last stage. Two forms of advertising
are studied– blanket and targeted. Under blanket advertising, firms communicate to
all consumers and the probability that each consumer sees an ad depends on the level
of ad expenditure. We find that when blanket advertising is relatively ineffective, i.e.,
it is costly to ensure high consumer awareness, both firms will choose a light level of
ad spending. This allows firms to select relatively undifferentiated qualities, without
concern of intense price competition. When blanket advertising is very effective, the
high quality firm expends heavily on advertising, while its rival differentiates with a
low quality product and expends less on advertising. Interestingly, in a mid range
of advertising effectiveness, one firm chooses a high quality product, but because its
rival positions close by, it selects a low ad expenditure to avoid competing fiercely
in prices. Under targeted advertising, firms choose the specific segment(s) they wish
to make aware of their product. We identify conditions such that both firms choose
equally high quality products, but advertise to different segments. This can result in a
middle pocket of unserved consumers, even though consumers with lower willingness
to pay are served.
(Product Quality, Advertising Strategy, Differentiation, Competition)
1 Introduction
In order for consumers to consider the purchase of a product, they must first be
aware of its existence.1 Though there are a number of ways for consumers to become
aware of the products available in the marketplace, firm initiated communications is
a primary vehicle. In some contexts, firms can send targeted messages only to those
consumers who are part of their selected target market. For example, by purchasing
or compiling a list of consumers that meet certain criteria, firms can send targeted
e-mails or direct mail. In other cases, firms use media outlets where they cannot
directly control who sees their ad. For example, by placing a commercial on national
TV or placing an ad in a general interest magazine, a firm will potentially reach a
broad set of consumers. It is noteworthy that in the US alone companies spent over
$268 Billion in 2005 to advertise their offerings to consumers.2
Consumers consider the various products they are aware of and choose the one that
delivers them maximum utility. Consequently, the return to a firm on advertising will
critically depend on how its offering compares to the other offerings in the marketplace
and how those products are advertised, i.e., which products constitute consumers’
consideration set. In this context, the decision of what quality product to offer, and
then how heavily to promote it through advertising, become intertwined, and further
depend on the rival’s product positioning and advertising strategy.
In this paper, we study a market where consumers are initially unaware of which
products are available for purchase. We seek to understand how the need to advertise
in order to be included in the consumer’s consideration set affects a firm’s decision
of where to position its product vis-a`-vis the competition. Specifically, we develop a
duopoly model in which firms choose product quality in a first stage, their advertising
strategy in a second stage, and set prices in the last stage. Consumers are heteroge-
neous with respect to their valuation for quality allowing for vertical differentiation.
1Behavioral models of the consumer’s decision making process (DMP) typically include the stages
of awareness, consideration, preference and ultimately purchase (?, see, for example,).
2Advertising Age, October 2, 2006.
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We study two forms of advertising that firms can use to generate awareness for
their product. The first type– blanket advertising– captures such situations where
firms communicate to all consumers indiscriminately (on poupular shows on broad-
cast television or radio). The probability that a given consumer receives a firm’s
communication is a function of the advertising expenditure. Specifically, a high ad
spend guarantees that all consumers will receive the ad while a low ad spend results in
only a likelihood that each consumer receives the ad. In general, we show that firms
can be better off under low levels of advertising because this allows them to choose
higher quality product positioning, yet avoid fierce price competition. Three main
equilibria can emerge depending on the effectiveness of blanket advertising, which is
a function of the cost differential between heavy and light advertising expenditure.
When advertising is relatively ineffective, neither firm gains much from advertising
heavily. One firm selects maximal quality while its rival chooses a quality level that is
similar, i.e., firms are relatviely undifferentiated. When, at the other extreme, blanket
advertising is very effective, one firm chooses maximal quality and expends heavily on
advertising. The rival now prefers to differentiate with a lower quality product and
to expend less on advertising. In a mid range advertising effectiveness, we get the
intriguing result that by choosing quality appropriately, the low-quality firm induces
the high-quality firm to expend only lightly on advertising. This happens because the
benefit to the high-quality firm from advertising heavily is diminished by the ensuing
fierce price competition.
The second type of advertising we examine–targeted advertising–captures situa-
tions where firms can communicate to specific segment(s) they wish to make aware of
their product. We establish the uniqueness of equilibria where each firm advertises to
a different segment. Because each consumer is only aware of one product, the firms
do not compete in the pricing stage and hence both choose equally high quality– that
is, their products are entirely undifferentiated in quality. Interestingly, due to the
relatively high prices firm charge, there exist conditions such that a set of consumers
with moderate valuation for quality are unserved by the firm that advertises to them,
even though consumers in a different segment with lower willingness to pay are served
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by the rival firm. We also show that the total number of consumers served follows an
inverted-U shape as a function of the size of the lower-valuation segment.
In an extension we study the role of persuasive advertising. Contrary to the two
types of advertising that build awareness, persuasive advertising changes the way
consumers perceive the quality of product; thereby, affecting their willingness to pay.
Our main result here is that firms differentiate less in objective quality than under no
advertising, but the difference in advertising levels counterbalances this effect leading
to a higher degree of differentiation in perceived qualities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section relates our work
to the relevant literature and summarizes our contribution. Section 3 sets up the
basics of the model in terms of demand and firm behavior. Section 4 solves the
case of blanket advertising and Section 5 solves the case of targeted advertising. We
consider the extensions with persuasive advertising in Section 6. Finally, Section 7
concludes and discusses limitations. To enhance readability, we postpone all proofs
to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our work is primarily related to the vertical differentiation literature, beginning with
the widely known work of Shaked and Sutton (1982). They extend the model of price
competition between firms by allowing them to choose the quality of the products
they sell. Since consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of quality,
in equilibrium, firms choose different qualities in order to reduce price competition in
the last stage. The authors also consider entry behavior and show that no matter how
many potential entrants there are, exactly two of them enters the market. Moorthy
(1988) relaxes Shaked and Sutton’s zero cost of production assumption by introduc-
ing a quadratic cost function for quality, resulting in an equilibrium where the firm
choosing the lower quality may be better off. Moorthy further shows that both in the
simultaneous-quality-choice and the sequential-quality-choice model, the equilibrium
strategies are to differentiate. Assuming that firms do not cover the market, Choi
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and Shin (1992) show that the low quality firm will choose a quality level which is a
fixed proportion of the high quality firm’s choice. Wauthy (1996) on the other hand,
gives a full characterization of quality choice, allowing the coverage of the market to
be endogenous.
Although the previous studies show that quality differentiation is an equilibrium
outcome, similar quality products are often observed in the market. Rhee (1996) offers
an explanation incorporating consumer heterogeneity along unobservable attributes
into the vertical differentiation model. As a result, if consumers are sufficiently het-
erogeneous, firms offer identical quality products in equilibrium. Banker et al. (1998)
investigate the relationship between equilibrium quality levels and the intensity of
competition between firms. They find that the relation depends on how firms inter-
pret increased competition and also the parameters describing the cost and demand
structure. In the recent literature, Choudhary et al. (2005) and Jing (2006) both find
that the higher quality firm can be worse off in equilibrium. Choudhary et al. exam-
ine a model of vertical differentiation where personalized pricing is allowed. While
personalized pricing results in a higher market coverage, it also intensifies the compe-
tition, which can hurt the high quality firm. Jing explicitly identifies the conditions
under which producing the low-quality good is more profitable by examining the cost
structure Notably, the papers in this stream analyze firms’ quality positions under
various price and cost assumptions, but assume that all consumers are fully aware of
these qualities and ignore the role or need for advertising.
Another stream of literature related to our work is the vast amount of studies on
advertising that we do not summarize here. We thus focus on those which examine
the relationship between advertising and product quality. It is theoretically well-
established in the economics and marketing literature that advertising can be a signal
of quality (Nelson 1974, Milgrom and Roberts 1986), however these papers ignore the
informativeness of advertising and thus its effect on the market size. On the contrary,
Zhao (2000) shows that when advertising raises awareness, spending less is the correct
signaling approach of the high-quality firm. Iyer et al. (2005), on the other hand,
investigate how firms should target their advertising. They find that firms advertise
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more to consumers who have a strong preference for their product and argue that
this is a way to increase differentiation in the market.
Our contribution lies in extending the first stream of literature by exploring the
interaction between advertising spending and quality choice and by showing how ad-
vertising can lead to less or no differentiation.3 As Zhao, we also employ models
where advertising generates general awareness and also explore targeted and pursua-
sive advertising.
3 Model Setup
We assume that there are two competing firms selling their products and every con-
sumer purchases at most one unit of the product. We index the firms by the numbers
1 and 2 or the letters i and j, always assuming that i 6= j. Note also, that if firms offer
different quality products we denote the firm offering the lower quality product by
1. We assume that the consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their valuation
of quality, denoted by ϑ. The parameter ϑ is uniformly distributed in the interval
I = [0, 1]. A consumer with parameter ϑ gains utility ϑs− p by purchasing a product
with quality s for price p. The consumers purchase the product for which their utility
is higher, however, consumers can only purchase products that they are aware of. A
consumer is only aware of a product if s/he sees an advertisement of it. We study
two different types of advertising mechanisms that generate awareness. In the first,
which we call blanket advertising every consumer sees the ad of firm i with probabil-
ity ai, independently, where ai represents the advertising effort. In the second, which
we call targeted advertising, firms can target segments (subsets) of consumers and a
consumer only sees the ad if s/he is in the targeted segment.
Timing
3The only exception we are aware of is Colombo and Lambertini (2003), who study persuasive
advertising in a market where quality levels are determined endogenously. they find that if the
relative advertising efficiencies are sufficiently different then the low quality firm earns a higher
market share and profits in equilibrium. Our model differs in that...
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The timing of the game is as follows. First, firms choose their qualities s1 ≤ s2.
Qualities are positive and have a maximum value that is normalized to 1. Second,
firms make their advertising decisions, and incur the promotion costs.4 Third, firms
set prices. Finally, consumers make their purchases. We assume no fixed entry costs,
hence both firms participate in the market.
Costs and profit
We assume that variable costs are constant and we normalize them to zero; hence,
our model is consistent with Shaked and Sutton (1982).5. However, advertising costs
depend on the advertising efforts in the following way. In the blanket advertising case
we assume that c(ai) is an increasing function of ai. In the targeted advertising case
we assume that cost is a linear function of the size of the targeted segment. Firms’
profits are therefore simply their revenues (price × sold quantity) minus advertising
costs;
Πi = piDi − cadvi .
We examine the pure-strategy sub-game perfect equilibria of the game. We now
determine the solutions in the two different cases; blanket advertising and targeted
advertising.
4 Blanket advertising
In this model both firms advertise to the whole mass of consumers but the probability
of the ad reaching a consumer (the effectiveness of the ad) depends on the effort the
firms make. For the sake of simplicity let us assume that there are only two levels of
4In the blanket advertising case they set ai and in the targeted advertising case they choose the
segments
5Having a fixed cost of developing a product would not qualitatively affect our results. Our
normalizing both variable and fixed costs of production to zero might seem an oversimplifying
assumption but is done for two reasons. First, our assumptions in this respect correspond to Shaked
and Sutton (1982), allowing us to compare our results to theirs. Second, it allows us to focus on the
strategic incentives of firms to differentiate in qualities when there are advertising costs invovled;
including production costs would complicate this analysis.
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advertising aL ≤ aH , with costs cL and cH , respectively, cH > cL. As a benchmark,
let us solve the case of a monopolist. A consumer who is aware of the product, buys
it if and only if ϑs − p ≥ 0. A consumer who is not aware of the product will never
buy it. That is, the demand of the monopolist consists of consumers that are aware
of the product and for which ϑ ≥ p/s. Therefore,
Dm(pm, am) = (1− pm/sm)am,
where a can be equal to aL or aH . The monopolist chooses price to maximize its
revenues, R(p, a) = p(1 − p/s)a. Given am and sm, p∗m = sm/2. Then its profit can
be written as
Πm(a) = s
2a/4− c(a),
which is increasing in s no matter what the advertising level is. Therefore, the
monopolist sets s = 1 and chooses aH over aL if and only if
aH−aL
4
> c, where
c = cH − cL. That is, the extra revenue of choosing the high level is greater than the
additional cost needed to advertise heavily rather than lightly.
4.1 Duopoly
After analyzing the case of a monopolist as a benchmark, let us turn to the case
of a duopoly. First, we solve the last stage, the pricing game, given qualities and
advertising levels. Fixing the qualities chosen by firms 1 and 2 at s1, s2, and the
advertising levels at a1, a2 we can characterize the pricing equilibria. Note that a
pure-strategy equilibrium does not always exist. The function f(a1, a2) describes the
critical s1/s2 under which a unique pure-strategy pricing equilibrium exists.
Claim 1 There exists a function f(a1, a2), such that 0 ≤ f(a1, a2) ≤ 1, f(a1, 1) = 1
for any a1, f(a, a) is increasing for a ≥ 1/2, and
1. If s1 < s2 and s1 ≤ f(a1, a2)s2, then the equilibrium prices are
p∗1 =
s1(s2 − s1)(2(s2 − s1)− a2s2 + 2s1(a1 + a2 − a1a2)
4s21(1 + a1a2 − a1 − a2) + s1s2(4a1 + 4a2 − a1a2 − 8) + 4s22
,
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p∗2 =
s2(s2 − s1)(2(s2 − s1) + s1(a1 + 2a2 − a1a2))
4s21(1 + a1a2 − a1 − a2) + s1s2(4a1 + 4a2 − a1a2 − 8) + 4s22
.
2. If s1 < s2 and s2 > s1 > f(a1, a2)s2, then there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.
3. If s1 = s2 and a1, a2 > 0, then the equilibrium prices are always zero.
The examination of the equilibria goes on similar lines as in the original vertical
differentiation model. However, the equilibrium does not always exist, because the low
quality firm may have an incentive to set a high price to serve only those consumers
who are aware of its product and not the competitor’s. This structure may result in
a game where there is no equilibrium. The details are postponed to the Appendix.
Now let us turn our attention to the stage where firms decide whether they want
to advertise heavily or lightly. Let us normalize s2 to 1, fix 0 < s1 < 1 and set
aH = 1. Let R
i
aiaj
(si) denote the revenue of firm i in the equilibrium of the pricing
stage, if it exists, given the advertising level choices ai, aj. Also, let G
i
aj
(s1) =
RiaHaj(si) − RiaLaj(si), denote the gains to firm i of advertising heavily instead of
lightly given firm j’s advertising level. The following claim describes the possible
equilibria at the advertising stage, denoted by (L,L), (L,H) or (H,H), where the
first letter shows the level chosen by the low quality firm, whereas the second shows
the choice of the high quality firm.
Claim 2 There exists a 0 < a∗ < 1, such that, for aL > a∗, we have the following.
1. If c ≥ G2L(s1) and s1 ≤ f(aL, aL) then the advertising equilibrium is (L,L).
2. If G2L(s1) ≥ c ≥ G1L(s1) then the advertising equilibrium is (L,H).
3. If G1L(s1) ≥ c then the advertising equilibrium is (H,H).
4. If c ≥ G2L(s1) and s1 > f(aL, aL) then there is no pure-strategy advertising
equilibrium.
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Figure 1: The different types of equilibria in the advertising stage for al = 0.75 and a2 = 1.
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Figure 1 shows the different types of equilibria for the different values of s1 and
c. Finally, we can solve for the qualities chosen in the (first) stage. We assume that
c < cM = (aH − aL)/4, which is the critical price for a monopolist to advertise high.
Proposition 1 For any aL > a
∗, there exist 0 < c < c < cM , such that with some
0 < s < 1, 0 < s < 1, we get the following equilibria
1. If c ≤ c < cM , then si = s,sj = 1 and the advertising equilibrium is (L,L).
2. If c < c < c, then si = (G
2
L)
−1(c),sj = 1 and the advertising equilibrium is
(L,L).
3. If 0 < c < c, then si = s,sj = 1 and the advertising equilibrium is (L,H).
The results in regions 1 and 2 are intuitive, if the extra cost of heavy advertising
is sufficiently high then both firms choose to advertise lightly, whereas with a lower
cost difference one firm chooses to advertise heavily and the other advertises lightly.
We calculate the numerical values in the following example.
Example 1 If aL = 3/4 and aH = 1, the proposition describes the equilibria with
cM = 1/16 = 0.0625, c ≈ 0.0238, c ≈ 0.0205, s ≈ 0.6503 and s = 0.64. See Figure 2.
It is interesting to see, that with advertising the degree of differentiation is lower
than in the original model without advertising. The intuition is that advertising
reduces price competition in the last stage, because not all of the consumers are aware
of both products. The degree of differentiation is generally increasing as c decreases,
but there is an exception. In the range c < c < c the differentiation decreases as c
decreases. The explanation is very interesting. With a lower c, firms would move into
the (L,H) advertising equilibrium but that is worse for the low quality firm than the
(L,L), hence it increases its quality to attain the (L,L) equilibrium. However, the
low quality firm ends up setting a quality level that is higher than optimal, given the
(L,L) advertising strategies. The following corollary is about the equilibrium profits.
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Figure 2: The bold line shows the different s1 values and advertising equilibria as c changes for
for aL = 0.75 and aH = 1. The right-hand size summarizes the types of advertising as c changes.
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Figure 3: Profits as functions of c for for cL = 0, aL = 0.75 and aH = 1.
Corollary 1 pi2 is a decreasing function of c for c ∈ [0, c], it is increasing for c ∈ [c, c]
and constant for c > c. Similarly pi1 is constant for c ∈ [0, c] and c > c and it is
increasing for c ∈ [c, c].
Figure 3 shows firms’ profit functions. Although the firm producing the low-
quality product always makes less profits than the other one, the result reveals a
surprising phenomenon in the [c, c] interval: Firms’ profits are increasing functions of
c, that is, the extra cost of advertising at a high level. The intuition is the following.
Although in this range neither of the firms advertises at a high level, their profits
are influenced by c, since the equilibrium differentiation level changes with c. It
is straightforward to see from the proof of Proposition 1, that the differentiation
increases as c increases. Obviously this results in an increased profit for firm 2, but
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also raises firm 1’s profits, as the the level of differentiation gets closer to the optimal
value for firm 1. This implicit strategic effect explains the surprising impact of the
cost difference.
Although in Proposition 1 we do not have an equilibrium where the advertising
equilibrium is (H,H), there are certain aL, aH levels where we would get both firms
advertising high at a low cost difference level. Let us consider the following example.
Example 2 If aL = 1/2 and aH = 3/4, we get a similar structure of equilibria
as in the proposition, but we have to take into account that the pricing equilibrium
might not exist in every region. That is, we have to calculate f(3/4, 3/4) ≈ 0.6930,
f(1/2, 3/4) ≈ 0.8250, f(1/2, 1/2) ≈ 0.5755 and we get the following equilibria
1. If 0.0414 < c < cM = 0.0625, then si ≈ 0.5755,sj = 1 and the advertising
equilibrium is (L,L).
2. If 0.0308 < c < 0.0414, then si = (G
2
L)
−1(c),sj = 1 and the advertising equilib-
rium is (L,L).
3. If 0.0045 < c < 0.0308, then si = 0.7155,sj = 1 and the advertising equilibrium
is (L,H).
4. If 0 < c < 0.0045, then si = 0.6503,sj = 1 and the advertising equilibrium is
(H,H).
5 Targeted Advertising
In this advertising model firms target segments (subsets) of consumers and a consumer
can only consider buying a firm’s product if s/he is in the targeted segment.6 For
the sake of simplicity, let us assume that consumers can be divided to two disjunct
intervals and firms can target none, both, or either one of these segments. With
6Here we assume that advertising is perfectly efficient, that is, the ads reach every single consumer
in the segment
13
the parameter 0 < t < 1, the two intervals are defined as consumers who have ϑ
less than t and consumers who have ϑ greater than t. Therefore, the size of the
low-valuation interval (L) is t, whereas the size of the high-valuation interval (H) is
1− t. Then the segment targeted by firm i(denoted by Si) can be ∅, L, Hor L ∪H.
The costs associated with advertising to the four possible segments are 0, cL, cH, cU ,
respectively. We assume that costs are linear in the absolute size of the segment.
That is, cL = cU t, cH = cU(1 − t),and cL∪H = cU . The general setup and timing of
the game is the same as described in Section 3. We assume that cU < t/4 to ensure
that both firms make positive profits in equilibrium.
It should be obvious that if t appraoches 0, i.e., the size of the low-valuation
segment is negligible, the problem reduces to the blanket advertising case where firms
can only advertise heavily. Hence,we focus our analysis on the case of t ≥ 1/3 (the
high-valuation segment is at most twice as large as the low-valuation segment). The
following result shows that if t ≥ 1/3, then in equilibrium firms do not differentiate.
They divide up the market in the advertising stage and do not compete in prices. If
t < 1/3, then the lower interval might be too small for firms to advertise to it and
they may end up both settling in the high intervals. However, in this case, the exact
description of equilibria would be too complicated.
Proposition 2 If t ≥ 1/3 then the only equilibria of the game are those sets of
strategies where s2 = s1 = 1, Si = L, Sj = H, pi = t/2and pj = max(t, 1/2).
The intuition behind the results is that in the advertising stage firms are better off
choosing disjunct segments, because then they are monopolists in their own segments
and do not have to compete in prices in the final stage. In the first stage, when firms
choose qualities, they separately maximize their qualities, since there is no strategic
interaction, they both choose the highest possible quality. Since both firms offer the
same quality, in equilibrium, either firm can end up advertising to the low-valuation
segment or to the high-valuation segment. Let us denote the firm advertising to the
low-valuation segment by 1 and the other one by 2.
14
Corollary 2 If 1/3 < t < 1/2, then equilibrium prices are p∗1 = t/2 and p∗2 = 1/2.
Consumers with valuation in the interval t and 1/2 are unserved, in the sense that
they do not buy either product.
It is usual in vertical differentiation models that consumers with the lowest valu-
ation, here below t/2, are unserved, because prices are too high for them to purchase
the products. However, note that if 1/3 < t < 1/2, then consumers in the middle,
with valuation between t and 1/2 are also unserved. They only consider buying the
product of the firm advertising to the high-valuation segment but the price is to high
for them to buy the product. The following corollary summarizes how the demand
changes as a function of t
Corollary 3 The demand for product 1 is an increasing function of t. The demand
for product 2 is a decreasing function of t. The total demand (consumers served) is
first increasing (t ∈ (1/3, 1/2]), then decreasing (t ∈ [1/2, 1]), attaining its maximum
at t = 1/2.
Figure 4 shows the demand for firms 1 and 2 and the total demand. As t increases,
firm 1 serves more consumers (those with a ϑ between t/2 and t). However, firm 2
serves all those who it advertises to except those below 1/2. The combination of the
two functions yields that the total number of consumers served and is an inverted-U
shaped function, with a maximum at 1/2.
6 Persuasive Advertising
In this section, we analyze an extension of the original model. Instead of focusing
on the awareness building features of advertising, we examine the case of persuasive
advertising. When consumers consider buying a product, its quality is an important
factor in determining how much they are willing to pay for it. But the actual quality
can be different from how consumers perceive it and obviously informative advertising
can change the process of quality assessment. In an empirical study, Moorthy and
15
Figure 4: The left tab shows the consumers served by the firms as a function of t, whereas the
right tab plots the total demand.
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Zhao (2000) find (in ten product categories for more than one hundred brands) that
advertising effort (spending) has a positive effect on perceived quality. Based on this
phenomenon, we modify the vertical differentiation model in the following way.
Let si denote the real quality of the product offered by firm i. As before, let ai
denote the advertising effort of firm i. We assume that 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1 and that the per-
ceived quality of product i is aisi. This simple formulation captures the fact, that by
advertising more, the firm can raise its product’s perceived quality. However, the real
quality forms an upper limit to the perceived quality.7 Aside from the formulation
of advertising, the setup of the game is equivalent to that of the blanket advertis-
ing model presented in Section 4. Firms first choose qualities simultaneously, then
advertising efforts, finally, the prices.
As a first step, let us examine a very simple, but rather unrealistic case, when
advertising is costless. Despite the oversimplifying assumption, this example sheds
light on how firms differentiate in qualities when they can use advertising to change
quality perception.
Claim 3 The game has infinitely many sub-game perfect equilibria, where sj = 1
and si can take any value between 4/7 and 1. Furthermore, in every equilibrium
aisi = (4/7)ajsj.
Interestingly, the degree of differentiation is less than or equal to the ration s1/s2 =
4/7 in the original vertical differentiation model (with no advertising). However, firms
further differentiate in perceived qualities and reach the ratio of 4/7.
In order to relax the assumption of costless advertising let us assume that adver-
tising effort is a discrete variable (as in Section 4). Firms can choose between ai = aL
and ai = aH , where 0 ≤ aL < aH ≤ 1. Furthermore, to ensure the existence of
an interior solution, we assume that 7aL > 4aH
8. Let cL and cH denote the costs
7This formulation is equivalent to that in which the upper limit is a linear function of the real
quality
8The assumption does not change the structure of the equilibria
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associated with the two advertising levels, with cL sufficiently low, that both firms
enter the market. Again, let c = cH − cL.
Proposition 3 There exist 0 < c < c, such that we get the following sub-game perfect
equilibria
1. If c ≤ c, then si = 4/7,sj = 1 and the advertising equilibrium is (L,L).
2. If c ≤ c < c, then si = (4/7)(aH/aL),sj = 1 and the advertising equilibrium is
(L,H).
3. If 0 < c < c, then si = 4/7,sj = 1 and the advertising equilibrium is (H,H),
The intuition behind the results is simple; if the extra cost of high-level advertising
is sufficiently high then both firms choose the low level. If the cost difference is in
the middle range one firm chooses to advertise high and the other advertises low,
whereas if the cost difference is low, both firms can afford to advertise high (see
Figure 5). Note that in the low and high regions the degree of differentiation is the
same as in the model without advertising (4/7). However in the middle range we
find the same phenomenon as in the simple example of Claim 3. The quality ratio
s1/s2 is higher than 4/7, corresponding to a smaller degree of differentiation, which
is compensated by the difference in advertising efforts leading to a perceived quality
ratio of 4/7 = (s1a1)/(s2a2).
7 Conclusion
We studied a market where consumers are initially unaware of which products are
available for purchase. We examined how the need to advertise in order to be included
in the consumer’s consideration set affects a firm’s decision of where to position its
product vis a vis the competition. We developed a model in which firms choose
product quality in a first stage, their advertising strategy in a second stage, and
set prices in the last stage. We studied three forms of advertising. Two of them,
18
Figure 5: The bold line shows the different s1 values and advertising equilibria as c changes for
for aL = 0.5 and aH = 0.75.
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firms can use to make consumers aware of their product – blanket advertising and
targeted advertising. The third form is persuasive advertising, which serves to change
consumers’ perception of the product, resulting in an increase in perceived quality.
In the case of blanket advertising, we showed that firms can be better off under
low levels of advertising because this allows them to choose higher quality product
positioning, yet avoid fierce price competition. The equilibria of the game depend on
the cost efficiency of advertising. When advertising is relatively ineffective, differen-
tiation is relatively low and both firms advertise at a light level. When, at the other
extreme, advertising is very effective, one firm chooses maximal quality and expends
heavily on advertising. The rival now prefers to differentiate with a a much lower
quality product and expend less on advertising. In a mid range, we obtained the
intriguing result that by choosing quality appropriately, the low-quality firm induces
the high-quality firm to expend only lightly on advertising. This result sheds light on
how advertising and quality choice interact in a firm’s strategy. It is important for
managers to see that by making the two decisions separately they may be worse off.
Under targeted advertising, our main result was that each firm advertises to a
different segment. Thus, firms do not compete in the pricing stage and hence both
choose equally high quality– that is, their products are entirely undifferentiated in
quality. Interestingly, due to the relatively high prices firm charge, there exist condi-
tions such that a set of consumers with moderate valuation for quality are unserved
by the firm that advertises to them, even though consumers in a different segment
with lower willingness to pay are served by the rival firm. We also showed that the
number of consumers served is an inverted-U shaped function of the lower segments
size.
In an extension we studied the role of persuasive advertising. Our main result
here is that firms differentiate less than under no advertising but the difference in ad-
vertising levels counterbalances this effect leading to a higher degree of differentiation
in perceived qualities.
Although we thoroughly examined three different types of advertising, our study
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has several limitations. First, we analyze the advertising models separately. One could
imagine a general model, where advertising is persuasive and also builds awareness
at the same time. Also, combining the first two models, we would get a general
setting in which advertising can be targeted but the reach of consumers is not perfect,
resulting in two decision variables: the segment to target and the effectiveness of
reaching consumers in the chosen segment. Second, we have employed very stylized
assumptions on costs. In order to simplify the models, we assume that products are
made at a zero variable cost and that producing a high quality product does not
cost more. This way we were able to focus on the strategic forces that drive the
differentiation. We leave the incorporation of variable costs to the model to future
research.
21
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Claim 1
The demand structure is very similar to the original model, for those consumers, who
aware of both firms’ products. However, we have to consider those who are only aware
of one of the two firms’ product. Let us introduce notations for three types of indifferent
consumers. The consumer, who’s ϑ parameter is t2 = p2−p1s2−s1 obtains the same utility from
buying firm 1’s and firm 2’s product. The consumer with ϑ = t′2 =
p2
s2
obtains 0 utility from
buying firm 2’s product, that is, s/he is indifferent between purchasing from firm 2 and not
buying anything. Finally, t1 = p1s1 is the critical point of buying firm 1’s product versus
not buying anything.
If firm 1’s relative price is lower (p1s1 <
p2
s2
), then t1 < t′2 < t2. In this case the demands
are the following.
D1(p1, p2) = a1(t2 − t1) + a1(1− a2)(1− t2).
D2(p1, p2) = a2(1− t2) + a2(1− a1)(t2 − t′2).
If, on the other hand p1s1 ≥
p2
s2
, then firm 1 only sells its product to the consumers who are
not aware of firm 2. In this case
D′1(p1, p2) = a1(1− a2)(1− t1),
D′2(p1, p2) = a2(1− t′2).
Since the variable cost is zero, the revenue is simply the price multiplied by the demand.
R1(p1, p2) =
{
p1D1(p1, p2), if p1 < p2s1s2 ,
p1D
′
1(p1, p2), if p1 ≥ p2s1s2 .
R2(p1, p2) =
{
p2D2(p1, p2), if p2 > p1s2s1 ,
p2D
′
2(p1, p2), if p2 ≤ p1s2s1 .
First we calculate the best response function of firm 2. Its revenue function consists of two
quadratic functions, with maximums at s22 and
s2−s1+p1a1)s2
2(s2−s1+s1a1) , respectively. Depending on
the value of p1 , the maximum is either attained in the first, the second, or the intersection.
If p1 <
s1(s2−s1)
2(s2−s1)+s1a1 , then the best response is b2(p1) =
s2−s1+p1a1)s2
2(s2−s1+s1a1) , if
s1(s2−s1)
2(s2−s1)+s1a1 ≤
p1 <
s1
2 , then the best response is b2(p1) =
p1s2
s1
, and if s12 ≤ p1, then the best response is
b2(p1) = s22 .
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For firm 1, the best response is either b1(p2) =
(s2−s1−a2s2+a2s1+a2p2)s1
2(s2−s1+s1a1) or b1(p2) =
s1
2 , depending on where the revenue is higher. Since b1(s2/2) < s1/2, the only possible
equilibrium is
p∗1 =
s1(s2 − s1)(2(s2 − s1)− a2s2 + 2s1(a1 + a2 − a1a2)
4s21(1 + a1a2 − a1 − a2) + s1s2(4a1 + 4a2 − a1a2 − 8) + 4s22
,
p∗2 =
s2(s2 − s1)(2(s2 − s1) + s1(a1 + 2a2 − a1a2))
4s21(1 + a1a2 − a1 − a2) + s1s2(4a1 + 4a2 − a1a2 − 8) + 4s22
.
This is an equilibrium if and only if firm 1 has no incentive to deviate, that is, if
p∗1D1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) ≤
s1
2
D′1
(s1
2
, p∗2
)
=
s1a1(1− a2)
4
. (1)
In order to define f , we need the following the lemma.
Lemma 1 R(s1) = p∗1D1(p∗1, p∗2) is a concave function of s1 for 0 ≤ s1 ≤ s2, R(0) =
R(s2) = 0 and R′(0) > a1(1− a2)/4 for a1, a2 > 0.
Proof: We can assume without loss of generality that s2 = 1. Then
R(s1) =
(1− s1)(1− s1 + a2s1)(−2a2s1 + 2s1 − 2s1a1 + 2a1s1a2 − 2 + a2)2a1s1
(−a1s1a2 + 4− 8s1 + 4s1a1 + 4s21 − 4s21a1 + 4a2s1 − 4a2s21 + 4a2s21a1)2
,
which is concave for 0 ≤ s1 ≤ 1, and
R′(0) =
(2− a2)2a1
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>
a1(1− a2)
4
for a1, a2 > 0
Now, let f(a1, a2) be the solution of the equation
p∗1D1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) =
s1a1(1− a2)
4
,
with respect to s1, setting s2 to 1. Since the left hand side is a concave and the right hand
size is linear function of s1, the solution is unique in the interval 0 ≤ s1 ≤ 1, and according
to the lemma 0 < f < 1. Since s1 only satisfies (1) if and only if s1 ≤ f(a1, a2), we have
proved parts 1 and 2.
Then f(a1, 1) = 1 for any 0 < a1 ≤ 1 also obviously follows from the lemma. In order to
prove that f(a, a) is increasing in a, we have to examine the function R(s1) more carefully.
One can check that
R(s1)− s1a(1− a)4
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is increasing in a if 1/2 ≤ a = a1 = a2 for any 0 ≤ s1 ≤ 1. Since R(s1) is concave and
R(0) = 0 this proves that f(a, a) is increasing for a ≥ 1/2.
If s1 = s2 and both advertising probabilities are positive, then there is always a positive
mass of consumers, who are aware of both products. Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium,
both prices have to be zero as a consequence of the Bertrand-type competition. On the
other hand asymmetric equilibria do not exist, since any of the firms would be better off by
setting a price of s1/2 = s2/2.
Proof of Claim 2
In order to determine a∗, we need the following observations, that can be proved by
basic algebraic calculations.
Observation 1 Let G(q) denote the derivative (G1H(1) − G2H(1))′ as a function of q for
0 ≤ q ≤ 1. Then G(q) is an increasing function, and G(q) = 0 has a solution in the interval
0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
Let a∗ be the solution of G(q) = 0, which is a∗ ≈ 0.7032.
Observation 2 If aL > a∗, then G1L(s1) < G
2
L(s1) and G
1
H(s1) < G
2
H(s1) for 0 < s1 < 1.
Now let us examine when the different types of equilibria are possible.
• (L,L)
If firm 1 chooses L, then firm 2’s best response to this is L if and only if c ≥ G2L(s1).
Firm 1’s best response to this is L if and only if c ≥ G1L(s1). Since G1L(s1) < G2L(s1),
this type of equilibrium emerges only if c ≥ G2L(s1). For its existence we also need
that an equilibrium in the last stage exist, that is, s1 ≤ f(aL, aL), otherwise no
equilibrium exists.
• (L,H)
If firm 1 chooses L, then firm 2’s best response to this is H if and only if c ≤ G2L(s1).
Firm 1’s best response to this is L if and only if c ≥ G1H(s1). Since in this case the
pricing equilibrium always exists (f(q,1)=1), this type of equilibrium emerges if and
only if G1H(s1) ≤ c ≤ G2L(s1).
• (H,H)
If firm 1 chooses H, then firm 2’s best response to this is H if and only if c ≤ G2H(s1).
Firm 1’s best response to this is H if and only if c ≤ G1H(s1). Since G1H(s1) < G2H(s1)
and the pricing equilibrium always exists, this type of equilibrium emerges if and only
if c ≥ G1H(s1). This completes the proof of the claim
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In order to complete the proof we need the following observations, that can be proved
by basic algebraic calculations.
Observation 3 G2L(s1) is decreasing for 0 ≤ s1 ≤ 1.
Observation 4 We have R2LH(s1) < R
2
LL for 0 < s1 < 1.
Observation 5 We have max{0≤s1≤1}R
1
LH(s1) = max{0≤s1≤1}R
1
HH(s1).
Let s = argmax(R1LL(s1)) and s = argmax(R
1
LH(s1)). Then Let c = G
2
L(s) and c =
G2L(f(aL, aL)).
Now we can start determining the equilibria at the quality choice stage. Let us first
examine firm 1’s best response quality choice to s2 = 1.
• If cM > c > c, then depending on s1 the advertising equilibrium is either (L,H) or
(L,L). Let s′ = (G2L)
−1(c) denote the critical value for (L,L) to realize. Therefore
firm 1 maximizes R1LH in the interval 0 ≤ s1 ≤ s′ and R2LL in the interval s′ ≤ s1 ≤ 1.
According to Observation 4, the maximum of R2LL is greater than the maximum
of R1LH . On the other hand, it follows from the definition of c that R
2
LL attains
its maximum in the interval s′ ≤ s1 ≤ 1, hence firm 1’s best response is s and the
advertising strategies are (L,L). Note that according to the definition of c, the pricing
equilibrium exist in this case.
• If c > c > c, then firm 1 still maximizes R1LH in the interval 0 ≤ s1 ≤ s′ and R2LL in the
interval s′ ≤ s1 ≤ 1. However, in this case, the R2LL() does not attain its maximum
in the interval s′ ≤ s1 ≤ 1. On the other hand, R2LL(s′) ≥ max{0≤s1≤1}R2LH(s1),
therefore, the best response of firm 1 is s′ = (G2L)
−1(c) and the advertising strategies
are (L,L). Note that according to the definition of c, the advertising equilibrium still
exist in this case.
• If c > c ≥ 0 let s′′ and s′′′ denote the two solutions of G1H(s1) = c, if they exist. then
firm 1 maximizes R1LH in the interval 0 ≤ s1 ≤ s′, except for the interval s′′ ≤ s1 ≤ s′′′,
where it maximizes R1HH − c, if s′′ and s′′′ exist, that is, if c ≤ maxG1H(s1). Since
max{0≤s1≤1}R
1
LH(s1) = max{0≤s1≤1}R
1
HH(s1), firm 1’s best response is always s and
the advertising strategies are (L,H).
• If c = 0, then the firm 1 is indifferent between 4/7 (where R1HH attains its maximum)
and s.
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In order to show that the above strategies are equilibria, we have to show that firm 2’s
response to firm 1’s actual action is s2 = 1. Note that firm 2’s profit functions R2LL(s2),
R2LH(s2) and R
2
HH(s2) are all increasing if we fix s1 at certain level. Thus, the only incentive
for firm 2 to not to choose s2 = 1, if it could change the advertising equilibrium and increase
its payoff trough that. This is, however not possible, as the only change that it could attain
by decreasing s2 from 1 is to change an (L,H) equilibrium to an (L,L) which is obviously
not profitable. Thus, we have shown that all the above described strategies are equilibria.
We have to show that no other equilibrium exists, that is, that s2 is always 1 in equilib-
rium. Let us assume that an equilibrium exists with s∗2 < 1. The advertising equilibria and
the best response of firm 1 can be calculated the same way as for s2 = 1, except that the
s1 values have to multiplied by s∗2. As mentioned before, for a fixed advertising equilibrium
and a fixed s1, the profit of firm 2 is strictly increasing in s2. Thus, the only way firm 2 has
no incentive to increase s2 is if that would change the advertising equilibrium and decrease
profits. However, the above cases show that the only possibility to such a change would be
from (L,L) to (L,H), but that does not decrease firm 2’s profit. This completes the proof
of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we examine the pricing stage of the game given the quality levels and the advertising
segments.
1. If the two segments are distinct, that is, if S1∩S2 = ∅, then there is no price competi-
tion between the firms. They both maximize their income in their own segment. For
the firm choosing the high interval (Si = H), the optimal price is p∗i = max(si/2, sit).
For the firms choosing the low interval (Sj = L), the optimal price is p∗i = sjt/2.
2. If both firms choose both intervals, that is , if S1 = S2 = L ∪ H, then there is full
price competition and the pricing equilibria are the same as in the basic model. We
have covered this case in Claim 1. Substituting a1 = a2 = 1 there yield the equilibria
in this case. That is, if s1 = s2, then prices go down to zero, whereas if s1 < s2, then
p∗1 =
s1(s2 − s1)
4s2 − s1 ,
p∗2 =
2s2(s2 − s1)
4s2 − s1 ,
where the indifferent consumer has a parameter of t∗2 =
p∗2−p∗1
s2−s1 =
2s2−s1
4s2−s1 .
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3. If the firms choose the same intervals, for example S1 = S2 = H, then in case of
s1 = s2 equilibrium prices are zero. If s1 < s2, then depending on t four equilibria
are possible. If t ≤ s2−s14s2−s1 , then
p∗1 =
s1(s2 − s1)
4s2 − s1 ,
p∗2 =
2s2(s2 − s1)
4s2 − s1
form an equilibrium. If s2−s14s2−s1 ≤ t ≤ s2−s12s2+s1 , then
p∗1 = ts1,
p∗2 =
s2 − s1 + ts1
2
.
If 1/2 > t ≥ s2−s12s2+s1 , then
p∗1 =
(s2 − s1)(1− 2t)
3
,
p∗2 =
(s2 − s1)(2− t)
3
.
If t ≥ 1/2, then
p∗1 = 0,
p∗2 = s2t/2.
4. If S1 = S2 = L, then in case of s1 = s2 equilibrium prices are zero. If s1 < s2, then
the game is equivalent to case 2, but we have to normalize the top of the interval to
1, that is,
p∗1 = t
s1(s2 − s1)
4s2 − s1 ,
p∗2 = t
2s2(s2 − s1)
4s2 − s1 ,
5. If S1 = L and S2 = L ∪ H, then in case of s1 = s2 equilibrium prices are zero. If
s1 < s2, then the price competition is limited to consumers below t. That is, firm
1 only has an incentive to decrease prices until the position of indifferent consumer
t2 = p2−p1s2−s1 reaches either t or t
∗
2. That is, in case of t > t
∗
2, the equilibrium prices
are the same as in case 2. On the other hand, if t ≤ t∗2 then p∗1 = s1t/2 and p∗2 =
max(s2/2, s2t).
27
6. If S1 = L ∪ H and S2 = H, then in case of s1 = s2 equilibrium prices are zero. If
s1 < s2, the price competition is limited to consumers above t. That is, firm 2 only has
an incentive to decrease prices until the position of indifferent consumer t2 = p2−p1s2−s1
reaches either t or t∗2. That is, in case of t < t∗2, the equilibrium prices are the same
as in case 2. On the other hand, if t ≥ t∗2 then p∗1 = s1t/2 and p∗2 = max(s2/2, s2t).
7. If S1 = H and S2 = L ∪ H, then in case of s1 = s2 equilibrium prices are zero. If
s1 < s2, then two equilibria are possible. If t ≤ s2−s14s2−s1 , then
p∗1 =
s1(s2 − s1)
4s2 − s1 ,
p∗2 =
2s2(s2 − s1)
4s2 − s1
form an equilibrium. If t ≥ s2−s14s2−s1 , then
p∗1 =
(s2 − s1)(2ts1 + s2 − 3ts2)
7s2 − 4s1 ,
p∗2 =
(s2 − s1)(t+ 2)s2
7s2 − 4s1
form an equilibrium.
8. If S1 = L ∪ H and S2 = L, then in case of s1 = s2 equilibrium prices are zero. If
s1 < s2, then if
t <
20s22 + s
2
1 − 12s1s2 + (4s2 − s1)
√
8s22 + s
2
1
2(17s22 − 9s1s2 + s21)
there is no price competition and p∗1 = max(s1/2, s1t), p∗2 = s2t/2. Otherwise there is
price competition and
p∗1 =
s1(s2 − s1)(2− t)
4s2 − s1 ,
p∗2 =
(s2 − s1)(2ts2 − ts1 + s1)
4s2 − s1 .
9. If either firm chooses not to advertise then the other firm is a monopolist in its
segment, setting the price to max(six, siy/2) if the segment is the [x, y] interval.
Now we study the advertising stage, that is, which segments firms choose to advertise
to. Let us examine the different types of possible equilibria. A type is denoted by a pair
(S1, S2), where the first set denotes the segment chosen by firm 1 and the second denotes
the segment chosen by firm 2. First we fix s1 < s2 and determine which types of equilibria
are possible if t ≥ 1/3. Note that we do not consider cases where a firm does not advertise.
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• (L,H) In this case R1 = s1t2/4, R2 = s2/4 if t < 1/2 and R1 = s1t2/4, R2 = s2t(1−t)
if t ≥ 1/2. In order to check when this constitutes and equilibrium we have to check
three cases. First, if t ≥ 1/2 firm 1 has no incentive to deviate since it cannot reach
consumers above t∗2 =
2s2−s−1
4s2−s1 ≤ 1/2. Firm 2 is better of by choosing S2 = L ∪ H if
and only if
4s22(s2 − s1)
(4s2 − s1)2 − s2t(1− t) > cL = tcU . (2)
If 1/2 > t > t∗2, then the condition is
4s22(s2 − s1)
(4s2 − s1)2 −
s2
4
> cL = tcU . (3)
Finally, if t∗2 ≥ t, then firm 2 has no incentive deviate, however firm 1 does have if
and only if
s1s2(s2 − s1)
(4s2 − s1)2 − s1t
2/4 > cU = (1− t)cU . (4)
• (L ∪ H,H) In this case firm 2 has no incentive to deviate. However, firm 1 is better
of setting S1 = L if t ≥ t∗2. If t < t∗2 firm 1 deviates if and only if (4) does not hold.
• (L,L ∪ H) In this case firm 1 has no incentive to deviate. However, firm 2 is better
of setting S1 = H, if t ≤ t∗2. If t > t∗2, firm 2 will deviate if and only if (2) and (3) do
not hold in the cases t ≥ 1/2 and 1/2 > t > t∗2, respectively.
In the following cases one of the firms always has an incentive to deviate, thus, they do
not constitute equilibria. We assume that firms make positive profits otherwise it would be
profitable for them to not advertise at all.
• (L ∪ H,L ∪ H) In this case either firm 1 or firm 2 has an incentive to deviate. If
t ≤ t∗2 = 2s2−s14s2−s1 , then consumers above below t∗2 will not buy from firm 2, therefore
firm 2 is better of setting S2 = H. On the other hand, if t ≥ t∗2, then firm 1 is better
off setting S1 = L.
• (L,L) In this case firm 2’s revenues are t2 4s22(s2−s1)4s2−s1 . If firm 2 chooses S2 = L ∪ H
instead, then its revenues are at least 4s
2
2(s2−s1)
(4s2−s1)2 , that is, are at least 1/t
2 times more.
Since costs are only 1/t times more, firm 2 has incentive to deviate.
• (H,H) If firm t ≥ 1/2, firm 1 does not get any revenues, thus it obviously deviates.
If t ≥ s2−s12s2+s1 , then firm 1 has an incentive to choose S1 = L, because then it makes
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s1t
2/4− tcU instead of (2t−1)2(s2−s1)/9− (1− t)cU and s1s2−s1 ≥ 1−2t3t in this region.
Then one can check that if 1/5 ≤ t ≤ 1/2, then
(1− t)1− 2t
3t
t2
4
− t(2t− 1)
2
9
≥ 0.
If 1/3
leqt ≤ s2−s12s2+s1 , then has an incentive to choose S1 = L, because then it makes s1t2/4−
tcU instead of
ts1(s2−s1+ts1−2ts2)
2(s2−s1) − (1− t)cU . If t ≤ 1/3, one can check that
(1− t)s1t
2
4
− t ts1(s2 − s1 + ts1 − 2ts2)
2(s2 − s1) ≥ 0.
• (H,L) In this case firm 2’s revenues in the pricing stage are R2 = s2 ∗ t2/4, thus it
has an incentive to deviate to S2 = H or S2 = L ∪H.
• (L ∪ H,L) In this case firm 2 wants to choose S2 = H or S2 = L ∪ H depending on
whether t∗2 < t.
• (H,L ∪H) In this case firm
If s1 = s2, then in the cases where |S1 ∩ S2| > 0, equilibrium prices are zero, that
is, firms always have an incentive to deviate. The only possible advertising equilibria are
Si = L and Sj = H. In this case firms do not have an incentive to deviate if they make
positive profits.
Now we can examine the first (quality choosing) stage of the game. We start with the
case t ≥ 1/2. Note that firm 2’s revenue is increasing in s2 in any case, that is, in equilibrium
s2 = 1. Firm 1’s profit is
s−1(1−s1)
(4s2−s1)2 if (2) holds and s1 ∗ t2/4 if not. Therefore, firm 1 is
better of if (2) does not hold, therefore in equilibrium s1 = 1 must hold. It is easy to check
that there are equilibria with s1 = s2. Firms choose disjunct segments: Si = L,S| = H and
the corresponding prices pi = t/2, pj = t.
If 1/3 ≥ t < 1/2, firm 2 again sets s2 = 1 in equilibrium. Firm 1 is obviously better
off if t∗2 > t, since t∗2 is decreasing in s1 and firm 1’s profit is at least s1t2/4 − cL in this
case. As s1 approaches s2, t∗2 goes to 1/2, hence firm 1 can attain that t∗2 > t. However, if
t∗2 > t, then firm 1’s profit is increasing in s1 thus, in equilibrium, s1 = 1 must hold. As in
the previous case It is easy to check that there are equilibria with s1 = s2. Firms choose
disjunct segments: Si = L,S| = H and the corresponding prices pi = t/2, pj = 1/2. This
completes the proof of the proposition.
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Proof of Claim 3
The pricing stage of the game is equivalent to that of the original vertical differentiation
model with s′1 = a1s1 and s′2 = a2s2. Therefore, the revenues, as functions of s′1 and s′2, are
R1 =
s′1s′2(s′2 − s′1)
(4s′2 − s′1)2
R2 =
4s′2
s′1
R1. (5)
At the advertising stage, differentiating the two function with respect to a1 and a2 gives
the best response functions
a1 = min
(
4s2a2
7s1
, 1
)
for the low-quality firm and a2 = 1 for the high quality firm. Plugging these in the expres-
sions in (5), we get R2 = 7/48s2. Thus, one firm always chooses sj = 1. The other firm can
choose anything above or equal to 4/7, that is 1 ≥ si ≥ 4/7. A lower choice for si would
not allow the low-quality firm to reach the optimal advertising level in the next stage. All
the described strategies constitute sub-game perfect equilibria, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof goes on similar lines as the proof of Proposition 1. However, the pricing stage of
the game is much simpler here. In fact, it is equivalent to that of Claim 3. Thus, we can
use the resulting revenue functions from (5) and turn our attention to the stage where firms
decide whether they want to advertise at high or low levels. Let us normalize s2 to 1 and fix
0 < s1 < 1. Let RiLL(s1) denote the revenue of firm i in the equilibrium of the pricing stage
when both firm’s choose a1 = a2 = L. In the other three cases let RiLH(s1), R
i
HL(s1), and
RiHH(s1) denote the same revenue functions of firm i where the indices show the advertising
level chosen by firm 1 and 2, respectively. Also, let G1L(s1) = R
1
HL(s1)−R1LL(s1), G1H(s1) =
R1HH(s1)−R1LH(s1) G2L(s1) = R2LH(s1)−R2LL(s1), G2H(s1) = R1HH(s1)−R2HL(s1) denote the
gains of setting advertising to high instead of low. One can check that G1L(s1) < G
1
H(s1) <
G2L(s1) < G
2
H(s1) if 1 ≥ s1 > 0. In the following we determine the possible advertising
equilibria given different c and s1 values.
• (L,L)
If firm 1 chooses a1 = L, then firm 2 chooses a2 = L iff c ≥ G2L(s1). However, firm 1’s
best response to this is L iff c ≥ G1L(s1). That is, an (L,L) advertising equilibrium
exist iff G2L(s1) ≤ c.
• (L,H)
If firm 1 chooses a1 = L, then firm 2 chooses a2 = H iff c < G2L(s1). However, firm 1’s
best response to this is L iff c ≥ G1H(s1). That is, an (L,H) advertising equilibrium
exist iff G1H(s1) ≤ c < G2L(s1).
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• (H,L)
If firm 1 chooses a1 = H, then firm 2 chooses a2 = L iff c ≥ G2H(s1). However, firm 1’s
best response to this is H iff c < G1L(s1). That is, an (H,L) advertising equilibrium
never exists.
• (H,H)
If firm 1 chooses a1 = H, then firm 2 chooses a2 = H iff c < G2H(s1). However,
firm 1’s best response to this is H iff c < G1H(s1). That is, an (H,H) advertising
equilibrium exist iff 0 < c < G1H(s1).
Now we can start determining the equilibria at the quality choice stage. Let us first ex-
amine firm 1’s best response quality choice to s2 = 1. Given that the advertising equilibrium
is (L,L) or (H,H), firm 1’s best response is to choose s1 = 4/7 as in the original model, since
advertising has the same effect on both firms’ perceived qualities. However, if the advertis-
ing equilibrium is (L,H), then firm 1 maximizes R1LH(s1) yielding s1 = 4/7(aH/aL). Note
that the maxs1 R
1
LH(s1) > maxs1 R
1
LL(s1) and G
2
L(s1) is increasing, thus always chooses
an s1 that leads to an (L,H) equilibrium over an (L,L) when it is possible, yielding
c = G2L(4/7(ah/aL)). Furthermore, firm 1 chooses an (H,H) equilibrium over and (L,H) if
and only if c < c = R1LL(4/7)−R1LH(4/7(ah/aL)) > 0. In order to show that firm 2 chooses
s2 = 1 in equilibrium, one can check that given any advertising equilibrium, firm 2’s profit
is an increasing function of s2, thus it chooses the maximum quality of 1.
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